Engineering essay

When rules stop helping.
Are we losing engineering judgement?

A technical standard should support a decision, not replace the decision itself.

On codes, standard detail sheets, the designer's responsibility, and the line beyond which standardisation turns into an obstacle to technical progress.

When good intentions turn against their own purpose.

Philosophy and psychology use the term enantiodromia. It describes a process in which a tendency, taken to an extreme, can turn into its own opposite. The principle was developed by Carl Gustav Jung, and Robert Greene also explores it in his book The Laws of Human Nature.

What is interesting is how precisely this term captures some current tendencies in bridge design.

Technical codes, regulations and standard detail sheets were created with good intentions. The aim was to unify procedures, raise quality, eliminate recurring mistakes and make the designer's work easier. Standardisation was meant to create room for the designer to focus more on the design of the structure itself.

Today, however, in some areas we observe the opposite effect.

The number of regulations grows, their scope expands, requirements change, and individual organisations create further internal rules, methodologies and technical conditions. As a result, the designer spends an ever larger share of their time not on designing the structure, but on checking whether the documentation complies with the current set of formal and technical requirements.

At the same time, questions are sometimes debated that have minimal impact on the safety, functionality or durability of the structure, while the space for genuine technical discussion shrinks.

The tool that was meant to simplify design is beginning to complicate it.

Chapter two — The core of the problem

Design.
Don't just redraw.

Every bridge is, to a certain extent, a unique technical work. It has its own geometry, structural behaviour, foundation conditions, construction technology options, operational requirements and economic constraints.

Weighing these conditions against one another and finding a suitable solution is precisely what engineering work is about.

Standard detail sheets and standard details are undoubtedly useful. They represent proven solutions that in many cases save time and reduce the risk of errors. The problem arises the moment a standard solution becomes the only admissible option, regardless of the conditions of the specific structure.

A detail that suits one structure need not suit another.

What is interesting is that the standard detail sheets themselves anticipate an individual approach.

Article 1.3, "Purpose of the standard sheets", states that the solution of details for a specific bridge may differ from the solution given in the standard sheets, in which case the consent of the future asset managers must be obtained.

Article 1.4, "Use of the standard sheets", is even more explicit:

"Although these standard sheets serve as an aid to unifying technical solutions in order to improve construction quality, they do not represent a final and unchangeable solution that must be adopted in the bridge design documentation." Standard detail sheets, art. 1.4 — Use of the standard sheets

And further:

"Creative elaboration according to the stage of the design documentation and an individual approach for each individual structure are assumed." Standard detail sheets, art. 1.4 — Use of the standard sheets

This is an exceptionally important provision.

The standard sheets themselves do not assume the mechanical adoption of every detail. On the contrary, they assume that the designer will assess them professionally, adapt them and develop them further according to the specific conditions.

Article 1.3 also sets the condition of the future asset manager's consent where a different solution is used. That is a legitimate mechanism of control and coordination with the future operator of the structure.

Consent, however, should not be confused with an obligation to adopt any standard solution without discussion. A different detail should be assessed on its technical suitability, functionality, reliability and the requirements for operation and maintenance.

In practice, we nevertheless encounter comments whose only justification is that the proposed solution is not identical to the standard sheet. Without assessing the technical reasons, without analysing the specific structure, and sometimes even without any attempt to understand why the designer chose a different solution.

Such an approach does not promote quality. It promotes only uniformity.

Not everything we can calculate can we also model correctly.

Today's analysis software makes it possible to build extensive spatial models of structures. It can analyse thousands of elements, combine load cases and produce enormous amounts of results. That does not mean the results automatically capture the real behaviour of the structure correctly.

Every model contains simplifications, assumptions and limitations. An experienced designer must be able not only to build a model, but above all to understand what the model can express and what it cannot.

With bridge structures it is common to split one technical problem into several partial tasks. A prestressed superstructure, for example, may be analysed using a beam model that adequately captures its longitudinal behaviour. A supplementary spatial plate-and-shell model may then serve for a more detailed assessment of transverse behaviour, internal force distribution or local effects.

Such an approach can be entirely correct and efficient. It does, however, have its limits.

In markedly skew structures, complex spatial behaviour arises. The skewness of the support lines, torsional effects, redistribution of internal forces and the spatial action of prestressing may be significantly interlinked.

A beam model may not adequately capture all these effects. And if the supplementary spatial model does not account for prestressing, the very interaction that is decisive for the particular structure may be lost.

The result can be two individually correct analysis models whose combined use still fails to give an adequate picture of the real behaviour of the structure. A procedure that yields reasonable results for an ordinary right-angled bridge need not be suitable for a markedly skew prestressed structure.

What matters, therefore, is not whether the designer used a particular type of model or a particular piece of software. What matters is whether the chosen analysis procedure adequately captures the governing effects and allows a safe design. And that is a question of professional judgement.

An analysis model is not the structure.
It is only its mathematical idealisation.

The result of a calculation is not automatically the result of a design.

Structural analysis is one of the main inputs to design. It is not, however, its only part.

The designer must also take into account the technological options for construction, the construction sequence, detailing principles, durability, maintenance and other circumstances that may not show up directly in the analysis model.

If the software determines the required reinforcement area, that does not mean the designer must mechanically adopt exactly that amount or arrangement. They may propose a larger bar diameter, a different spacing, add detailing reinforcement or adjust the reinforcement layout with regard to the expected behaviour and buildability.

Such decisions must, of course, respect the requirements of the relevant codes and the principles of safe design.

Engineering design is not a mechanical transcription of software output into drawings.

The designer's experience, their ability to anticipate possible problems and to understand the real behaviour of the structure are an inseparable part of a good design. If design is reduced to compliance with prescribed procedures alone, the space for professional growth and for finding better solutions is lost.

When a technical detail is judged without technical context.

In practice we also encounter requirements in which technical justification takes a back seat.

In many cases these requirements may well be justified. They should not, however, be applied without distinguishing the conditions for which they were created.

A technical standard should support a decision, not replace the decision itself.

Where does the client's authority end and the designer's responsibility begin?

In my view this is one of the most important questions.

The client undoubtedly has the right to define the requirements for the structure — its function, durability, operation, maintenance, economics and other parameters of the final work. The client also has the right to require compliance with contractually binding technical regulations, to review the documentation and to point out its shortcomings.

The technical supervisor, the asset manager and the other parties involved in preparation and construction all have an irreplaceable role in assuring quality.

The problem arises when review turns into directly prescribing a particular technical solution without adequate technical justification.

The designer is professionally and legally responsible for their design documentation to the extent imposed by law and by contract. That responsibility does not come into being because a sentence about the designer's responsibility is added at the end of the technical report. It exists independently of any such declaration.

If the designer is responsible for their solution, they must also have adequate room to develop it professionally.

That, of course, does not mean their decisions are beyond question. Every designer can make a mistake. Reviewing documentation, professional discussion and pointing out possible errors are not merely right — they are essential.

What is decisive is the way in which comments are made. If the client or a reviewing body identifies a specific problem, it should name it, justify it technically and allow the designer to respond.

The mere statement "this is what we require" or "this is how it is in the standard sheet" need not constitute an adequate technical argument, especially where the document in question admits other solutions as well. On the other hand, the designer must be able to defend their different solution. Appealing to one's own experience or conviction alone is not enough.

The relationship between the client, the reviewer and the designer should therefore not rest on the authority of a position, but on technical arguments and a clear division of competences and responsibility.

The client has the right to require a result. The designer has the duty to propose a technically correct solution. The specific limits of their decision-making are set by law, by contract and by binding technical requirements.

If the client requires a change to the professional design, it must be clear who decides on it, on what basis, and who bears responsibility for its consequences.

A client's approval of a solution does not in itself mean that the designer ceases to bear their professional responsibility. Equally, however, the designer cannot shift onto the client the responsibility for a solution they themselves proposed and signed, merely because it was the subject of review comments.

That is precisely why it matters that the final design is not merely the result of a series of instructions and revisions, but a professionally justified solution the designer can stand behind.

A designer, or the client's draftsman?

If we keep expanding regulations, detailed requirements, internal methodologies and formal rules, we may reach a state in which the designer no longer genuinely designs the structure. They will merely assemble documentation from predetermined solutions.

And yet responsibility for the final work will remain with them, to the extent set by law and by contract.

A paradox arises: the designer gradually loses professional autonomy, but not responsibility.

This has one more serious consequence. If we do not allow designers to look for new solutions, compare alternatives, experiment within the limits of technical rules and learn on specific structures, we constrain their professional growth.

Bridge engineering, however, has never moved forward by repeating known details unchanged. It developed through new materials, structural principles, analysis methods, construction technologies — and above all through professional thinking.

Regulations and standard solutions should be the result of experience gained, not a boundary beyond which we are no longer allowed to think.

Do we need fewer rules, or better rules?

The answer is certainly not to abolish technical regulations. Bridges are structures with high demands on safety, reliability and durability. Codes, technical conditions, review mechanisms and standard details are therefore indispensable.

What we need, though, is to distinguish more clearly between a binding requirement, a recommended solution and an example of good practice.

Every new requirement should have a comprehensible technical justification. It should bring real value, not merely another administrative duty.

It is equally important to preserve the option of a different technical solution wherever safety, functionality and binding rules allow it.

Instead of asking "Is it exactly according to the standard sheet?", we should ask more often:

"Is the proposed solution technically correct, safe, reliable and appropriate to this particular structure?"

Because that is what the purpose of design should be. Not to produce ever more extensive documentation proving compliance with every single formal rule, but to design good bridges.

And above all, not to forget that the designer should not be a mere executor of other people's decisions.

A designer should design. They should think, analyse, decide and bear responsibility for their professional solutions.

If we gradually take that possibility away, we may in the end achieve the exact opposite of what we originally intended. More rules, but less real engineering.

Easy Bridge® stands with bridge engineers.

Easy Bridge is built by people who design bridges every day. A tool that works with exact geometry and AutoCAD-native output is there to free your hands for what matters — the design and the professional decisions behind it.

— The Easy Bridge® team, bridge engineers with over 20 years of experience in 3D design

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